Daisy 2: The Sequel is Always Worse

President Richard Nixon once remarked that “People said my language was bad, but Jesus, you should have heard LBJ.” Lyndon Johnson was infamous on Capitol Hill for his profanity-laden tirades, and one shudders to imagine his reaction to the “Daisy 2” ad making the rounds on the internet.

Released yesterday by a group calling itself “Secure America Now,” the ad copies the imagery of its original: a 1964 campaign advertisement that LBJ’s campaign ran one time against Republican hardliner and presidential contender Barry Goldwater. In the new iteration, a young girl sitting in a field bears witness to a nuclear explosion, followed by an announcer warning against the Obama administration’s failure to keep Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

The most criminal thing about the so-called Daisy 2 ad—aside from its policy message being a reckless endangerment of American national security—is that it runs completely contrary to the cautionary message of the original advertisement. The ad’s implication of imminent war is intended to derail the critical work that the Obama administration has been doing to prevent an Iranian bomb.

The original Daisy advertisement is arguably one of the most controversial political maneuvers in American history. It ran on only one occasion; the idea that a campaign would heavily imply the death of a child on screen and that Goldwater would purposefully start a nuclear war provoked outrage. Even when the ad was pulled, it was replayed multiple times on many news stations—undoubtedly contributing to LBJ’s landslide victory.

This reboot of the ad is just as inflammatory, but for all the wrong reasons. The announcer cautions that failing to deal with Iran means that we as a nation “risk losing the freedom we cherish,” as if an Iranian invasion is all but imminent. One can imagine the follow up line:  Thank the good Lord for open carry, because the Persians are days away from storming the beaches!

In perhaps the most factually inaccurate part of the argument, the ad insists that “President Obama has had opportunities to stop [Iran], but he is failing.” There is no mention of Iran’s eliminated highly enriched uranium stockpile, no commentary on the most comprehensive and productive inspections regime the world has ever seen, and no acknowledgment of the halted construction of nuclear sites and hardware—all direct results of Obama’s approach of tough, principled, and multilateral diplomacy.

This is all to say nothing of the rest of the site, a true hatchet job that will make history majors and area studies specialists everywhere cringe in disbelief. Issues are conflated, terms are haphazardly misapplied, and to say that liberties are taken with words is to put it very mildly. This is truly a perfidious exercise in narrative sabotage—the logical conclusion of Republican wailing about Democratic leadership being feckless and weak and the insistence on shooting first and (maybe) asking questions later.  

Here is the central irony at the heart of the issue: the original Daisy ad was meant to cast a harsh light on the belligerent, conservative machine that was thundering toward war. Now, that same imagery is being used to fuel that machine. It implies that a preemptive strike is the only thing that can keep our children safe, where it is in fact the only course that leads to another costly war in the Middle East.

The only way forward where Iran does not build a nuclear weapon is through a negotiated settlement that brings Tehran back into the global community. Any preemptive strike will give the hardliners the raison d'être Iran’s weapons program is missing and lead to an inevitable conflict that really could threaten the U.S. and her interests. Agreements on enrichment limits with international eyes on the ground to enforce them, however, can keep our men and women out of harm’s way.

Maybe, in the end, LBJ would appreciate the savvy of those who launched the sequel to his infamous advertisement. At its core, both ads rest on unfulfilled assumptions and wildly pessimistic worldviews to produce a panicked, visceral reaction. But even though fear-mongering may be a part of our political past, it doesn’t have to be a part of our future.

With Love to Uncle Joe

Attending Netroots Nation last week in Detroit, Michigan gave me much to think about regarding liberals, progressives, leftists, and the soul of the modern Democratic Party.

I consider myself an ‘establishment’ Democrat, if there is such a thing. I believe that one works inside the system to affect meaningful change rather than making a ruckus on the margins. I think activists wearing business casual are more effective than those in t-shirts and flip-flops, and that it looks silly to snap when you agree with something when clapping works just fine. Compounding my slight feeling of ‘otherness’ is the fact that my issue area expertise and passion is in international affairs, a policy domain hardly present on the Netroots agenda.

That being said, I still found much to agree with those populating a gathering like Netroots. I fall squarely in the demographic characterization of other young liberals in many ways—I’m assertively areligious, a feminist, and believe in equality for all. And while I don’t buy completely into Senator Elizabeth Warren’s brand of aggressive, fire-in-your-belly populism, I consider substantive reform of the financial sector and tax code a serious question for debate within the party.  

One thing I didn’t agree with, however, was the overly cool reception to keynote speaker Vice President Joe Biden.  

I was particularly incensed when, partway through the Vice President’s remarks, a group of protestors interrupted his speech with chants of “Stop deporting our families!” I work in the communications field, and I respect the scrappiness of an issue advocacy campaign willing to do anything to get publicity for what they care about. Nonetheless, for progressives to shout over the man who has consistently been one of their top advocates on the inside is a foolish gesture that speaks to that nagging immaturity in the Democratic Party’s activist base.

The Vice President was gracious in responding to the interruption (far more so, it should be noted, than many Republicans facing similar assaults). He declared that “We should clap for those young people” as they were coaxed from the auditorium by the event staff. That poise and genuine sense of empathy only makes him more respectable.

The speech itself was solid. To be honest, it did not have the rhetorical flourish or deliberate, rythmic cadence of the great Obama speeches. But the Vice President’s use of volume was simply masterful in drawing in his audience; he would at times shrink to a whisper, only to ramp up to shouting and banging on the podium when driving home a key point. He has a Bill Clinton-esque ability to make you feel like of all the people in an auditorium, he is having a conversation specifically with you.

The Vice President’s value-ad, however, has never been eloquence; his most frequent criticism on the mainstream left of course revolves around his ‘gaffes.’ The party needs him, however, because he is a vocal contrarian, a tireless advocate, and relentlessly blunt. Vice President Biden must serve a vocal factor in the 2016 Democratic Party nomination battle.

As political ideologies grow increasingly polarized, the value of a contrarian in the party to provide a dissenting viewpoint is clear. Foreign policy in D.C. circles is prone to a pervasive groupthink, but the Vice President is often the voice of discord from within the crowd. He questioned the sagacity of the surge in Iraq, as well as the daring incursion onto Pakistani territory that resulted in the killing of Osama bin Laden. Regardless of if you share these particular policy positions, it takes a special brand of courage and conviction to disagree with the dominant narrative and challenge policymakers within the bubble of Washington.

The Vice President has led the pack as often as he questioned it, however. In a move that ought to have endeared him to progressives, his honest expression of his own tolerance forced the White House’s—if not the president’s—hand on the issue of marriage equality. But his tenure of advocacy is a long one; Senator Biden fought for the START II Treaty, pushed for women membership on the Senate Judiciary Committee, argued for “lift and strike” in Bosnia, and served as a tireless advocate for infrastructure development in the United States.

Perhaps the most endearing quality to his devotees, however, is that the Vice President has guts. Tell me about a timid and listless campaign, and I’ll show you man who lampooned Paul Ryan with the folksy disregard of “malarkey.” Bemoan to me a (false) perception of American weakness abroad, and I’ll show you a man who called Milosevic a “damn war criminal” and told Putin he didn’t have a soul to their respective faces. And shake your head in shame at a modern Democratic Party that is too spineless too often, and I’ll show you the guy who went on TV and—inadvertently or not—called healthcare reform exactly what it was: a big f*cking deal.

This is why, if the Vice President chooses to run come primary season, he’ll have my vote. If not Senator Warren, the progressives will surely choose a candidate to take on Hillary Clinton’s perceived corporatism. Clinton, to maintain the air of inevitability and defend against the right flank, will no doubt distance herself from the previous administration. Vice President Biden will be desperately needed in the primary conversation both to remind disillusioned youth voters of all we saw accomplished in the Obama years and to act as the elder statesman who can moderate a slowly emerging factional divide within the party.

Thank you for all of your public service, Uncle Joe. Please don’t stop just yet. 

The President Has No Clothes: What Egypt’s Bizarre Election Teaches About ‘Democracy by Coup’

According to the prevailing narrative, former Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Minster of Defense Abdel Fattah Al Sisi was always destined for his landslide election to the Egyptian presidency. The iconic military leader reportedly won over 96% of the vote in a landslide election over the past several days.

However, the victory care with an embarrassing asterisk:  the polls, originally supposed to close after two days of voting, stayed open for a third day to counter low turnout. The official rationale for this extraordinary measure was “the strong wave of hot weather” – a phenomenon one would assume Egyptians are quite familiar with.

However, there was a stick to accompany the carrot as well:  Prime Minister Ibrahim Mehleb also threatened to fine those who chose to abstain from the election despite being eligible. The state media apparatus too was beside itself with disdain for the low turnout numbers, with pundits alternating between pleading with, explaining to, and screaming at their viewers to go out and vote.

In truth, analysts are suggesting that the likely reason for the low turnout was either boycott or widespread apathy. By the end of the second day, few more than 30% of Egypt’s 50 million eligible voters had cast their ballots – far less than the previous election in 2012 that put the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi in to the presidency.

When the Egyptian military acted to remove Morsi from power in June 2013, they did so under the guise of popular mandate as represented by widespread street protests. The low turnout was thus embarrassing because Sisi’s overall vote total – even with his huge margin of victory – was far too low to extrapolate a ‘popular mandate’ from Egypt’s over 82 million citizens.

This is especially salient given that, for all his faults in both policy and messaging, Morsi was democratically elected following the ouster of the dictator Hosni Mubarak in 2011. Morsi received over 13 million votes (51.73%) in the June 2012 election that put him in office. At the end of the second day, where only 30% of 50 million citizens had voted, Sisi would have less than six million more votes than the man he had removed from power.

Clearly, this was a politically untenable situation for Sisi’s supporters, as they realized that their president-to-be ‘had no clothes.’ The supposed reality of unified support for Sisi in fact being the product of a small but invested and vocal minority was frightening to a state apparatus used to ignoring the popular will. But what are the implications for political theory and the nature of democracy?

The driving line of logic behind the Egyptian military’s return to power has been the faulty notion of a ‘democratic coup,’ or the idea that protests are the arbitrating tools of democracy and a pure expression of popular will. However, as the election demonstrates, this is an extremely problematic and dysfunctional application of popular sovereignty.

First, it is impossible to know who is protesting or backing protests at any given time. This concern is especially salient in the Middle East / North Africa region, where autocratic regimes have a long legacy of using the ‘deep state’ – militaries, intelligence agencies, police, and hired thugs – to project a façade of endearment from the streets. One needs look no further than the recent sham election in Syria to prove this point.

More academically, however, democracy by coup redefines legitimacy in an extremely subjective way. The idea that a government could be overthrown for simply falling below a certain threshold of popular approval is dramatically destabilizing. This notion also automatically assumes that the interests of the military are aligned perfectly with those of the people. In Egypt, however, the military is a powerful organization holds massive economic interests, social ties, and a clear sense of self-preservation.

Ultimately, democracy by coup is a fundamentally flawed notion because the power of democracy lies not in its elastic capacity to react to public will, but its institutional guarantees that that will be upheld. However unpopular the Brotherhood might’ve been, protests in the street were not the proper way to remove it from power. Moreover, electoral victories and failures serve as moderating forces on political parties, but now all the Brotherhood has taken away from its experience was that ‘democracy’ is not to be trusted.

Critics, however, look to history for an easy rebuttal, asking that if Mubarak was removed with popular protest, why not Morsi as well? The answer is simple: elections, rather than protests, are what makes a democracy sustainable. Mubarak’s regime was a thirty year-long exercise in curbing any will other than his own; the political system, dominated by the military and his party, was rigged completely in his favor.

Morsi, by contrast, did not have this support system. His presidential tenure – most notably his action to bypass judicial authority – can surely be categorized as troubling to a country and a people that had just gone through great pains to evict a dictator. Ultimately, his defense of these efforts to consolidate as measures to protect against the deep state were unconvincing to his fellow Egyptians and the world.

The fundamental problem, however, is that Morsi, the Brotherhood, and Egypt as a whole never got to see the true test of democracy: a willing transfer of power. A willingness and mechanism to peacefully abdicate power is the defining trait of democracy. The nascent Egyptian democracy was not given a chance to develop and bloom, but rather ripped out by the roots – all because the petals were slow to open.

Democracy by coup is a dangerous precedent to set for the rest of the world. The model’s appeal is particularly acute in developing countries where military juntas or strongmen are associated with order and growth as opposed to democracy, the harbinger of chaos and failed expectations. Put simply, Egypt is a poor example to follow, but the Sisi’s electoral struggles may not make that case clearly enough.

Fortunately, however, Sisi’s election – successful though it was – demonstrates how untenable democracy by coup can be. At best, perhaps this will motivate him to craft policy that will produce real benefits for his nation.  At the bare minimum though, it should at least encourage the Egyptian military to tread lightly on the rights and wishes of the Egyptian body politic, which will no doubt continue to keep struggling towards true popular sovereignty.

In Nuclear Talks with Iran, Hardliners – Not Centrifuges– Remain Key Challenge

Last week, representatives of the P5+1 and Iran began a new round of negotiations in Geneva aimed at achieving a final nuclear agreement by the July 20 deadline. This session was the most ambitious to date as the parties begin drafting an actual agreement to replace last November’s Joint Plan of Action.

Optimism ruled the day heading into this most recent round of talks given the relative smooth sailing of the previous four, but a significant obstacle remains: the two sides must come to an agreement about the scope of the Iranian nuclear enrichment capability, defined by the number of centrifuges.

However, this issue is less critical than the dominant media narrative might suggest. Instead, domestic opposition – fervently opposed to the leadership within their respective countries on the basis of blind principle –remains the truly greatest threat to a nuclear deal.

Many commentators are quick to declare that the number of centrifuges a state possesses directly correlates to its ability to build a nuclear weapon. The concern is that Tehran would have a stronger “breakout capability,” or shorter time it would take to develop a nuclear weapon, with ample centrifuges running.

Centrifuges spin rapidly in order to separate out the ‘good’ useful isotope of uranium, which occurs very rarely in nature. Arguably, the more centrifuges are running, the quicker a country can collect enough of the desirable uranium to form the ‘critical mass’ required for a weapon. Iran currently has around 19,000 centrifuges, though some 8,000 of those are not yet operable. Tehran has expressed a desire to expand to up to 50,000 centrifuges in the future – a number in stark contrast to the “few thousand” U.S. negotiators would prefer. 

However, a number as low as 3,000 centrifuges would be sufficient to produce a critical mass of enriched uranium in about a year. The numbers game becomes more complex when considering that civilian power plants require many more centrifuge cascades than would be necessary for a weapon. This is because power plants require a much smaller ratio of good to bad uranium but a much higher volume of both to use as fuel in a reactor.

It should be noted that many other factors besides a number of centrifuges impact a country’s breakout capability. Any nuclear deal with Iran will hinge on nuclear monitoring by international agencies; regardless of how many centrifuges Iran has, its compliance with monitoring (which has so far been forthright) will be the key to preventing cheating.

Moreover, hardware limits are not a surefire means to stop proliferation. North Korea has circumvented export controls on the materials used to construct centrifuges by developing indigenous manufacturing. Clearly, rogue states excluded from the international community can always find a way to build weapons. From that perspective, making centrifuges a sticking point seems unwise; constructive diplomatic relations are the best security solution for the long run.

For this litany of reasons, commentators should be less concerned centrifuge numbers. Instead, the chief challenge to reaching a deal will those who cannot see the forest for the trees; political groups within both countries resistant to any sort of peaceful resolution are actively working to disrupt the talks even as progress is being made.

The U.S. Congress, particularly the House of Representatives, continues to be a hotbed of opposition to the Obama administration’s outreach. The markup of National Defense Authorization Act in the Republican-controlled House Armed Services Committee resulted in an amendment that would prohibit any deal with Iran that did not involve Tehran renouncing support for terror groups and ceasing its ballistic missile program. More daunting still is the fact that President Obama’s ability to lift sanctions without an act of Congress would require executive waivers issued every four-to-six months.

Hardliners in Iran are also working to disrupt the deal. A conference under the slogan “We’re Worried” convened at the beginning of May, uniting conservative elected legislators, members of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration, and other conservative nationalists.  Moreover, 75 hardliners in the majlis attempted to discredit Foreign Minister and lead negotiator Mohammad Javad Zarif with a censure vote early this month simply because he publicly acknowledged the Holocaust as a “horrifying tragedy.”

Thankfully, the hardliners are in the minority in both countries. Poll numbers in the United States show that around 60% of Americans approve of the interim deal. Likewise, a similar majority of Iranians are either ‘very hopeful’ or ‘somewhat hopeful’ that the talks will end with a permanent deal, while less than half of them would support a military nuclear capability.

It is clear that the governments of Iran and the United States, as well as the peaceful majorities in each country, will have work against naysayers for a deal to succeed. There is hope for resolving technical questions, including the number of centrifuges, in negotiations so long as diplomats continue their work. Ultimately, it is the outdated attitudes of those who remain principally opposed to both fresh engagement and their own domestic rivals that remain the most significant danger to a normalization of relations between Iran and the West.